

Patricia E. Nolan (009227) Hearing Officer 7Y 2702 North Third Street, Suite 3000 Phoenix, Arizona 85004-4607 Telephone: (602) 280-1500

THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,

BEFORE A HEARING OFFICER

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF

DAVID W. COUNCE, Bar No. 010822.

Respondent.

No's. 02-1649, 02-1949, 03-0058 and 03-0217

HEARING OFFICER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter concerns a series of probable cause orders issued by the State Bar of Arizona. Probable Cause Order No. 02-1649 (regarding the Faulkner complaint) was filed on October 28, 2002. A second Probable Cause Order (No. 02-1949, concerning the Tibbs complaint) was filed on December 24, 2002. A third Probable Cause Order (No. 03-0058, regarding the Donahoe complaint) was filed on March 28, 2003. Following the issuance of these three Probable Cause Orders, a Complaint was filed on April 1, 2003. This Complaint was never served on Respondent.

On April 4, 2003, a fourth Probable Cause Order (No. 03-0217, concerning the Warfield complaint) was filed. An Amended Complaint was filed on that same date, adding a fourth count (with regard to the fourth Probable Cause Order). The Amended Complaint was personally served on Respondent on April 7, 2003.

Respondent did not file an answer to the Amended Complaint and, therefore, the Disciplinary Clerk filed a Notice of Default on May 2, 2003 and an Entry of Default on May 23, 2003.

Neither party requested to be heard in aggravation or mitigation and this Hearing Officer filed an Order on July 18, 2003 ordering that the parties submit simultaneous memoranda on or before July 2, 2003, at which time the matter would be deemed submitted. The State Bar filed its

1	Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Sanction on July 2, 2003
2	Respondent filed nothing.
3	FINDINGS OF FACT
4	Given the entry of Respondent's default, the facts set forth in the Complaint have been
5	deemed admitted by Respondent.
6	1. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was a member of the State Bar of Arizona
7	having been admitted on October 25, 1986.
8	COUNT ONE (01-1649)
9	2. Respondent represented Elizabeth Faulkner in a complaint for contribution filed
10	against her in the East Tempe Justice Court on November 1, 2000.
11	3. Respondent failed to communicate with Ms. Faulkner regarding the status of her
12	case from approximately January 2002 through March 2002.
13	4. Ms. Faulkner was then able to contact Respondent and was told by Respondent that
14	there was no activity with her case at that time.
15	5. In July or August 2002, Respondent again failed to respond to Ms. Faulkner's
16	request for information concerning her case.
17	6. In early August 2002, Ms. Faulkner contacted the Tempe Justice Court and learned
18	that a default judgment had been entered against her in the amount of \$16,000.00.
19	7. On September 27, 2002, Ms. Faulkner retrieved her file from Respondent. From
20	that file, Ms. Faulkner learned that her answer had been stricken on June 21, 2001 for failure to
21	produce discovery material and that her default had been entered. She also learned that the case
22	had been reinstated, but that her answer had again been stricken and a default entered on February
23	27, 2002, again for failure to produce discovery material.
24	8. From the retrieved file, Ms. Faulkner also discovered that a settlement proposal had
25	been sent to Respondent on November 21, 2001. Respondent had never informed Ms. Faulkner
26	about this settlement offer.
27	9. On August 27, 2002, the State Bar sent a letter to Respondent asking him to respond
28	to Ms. Faulkner's allegations. Respondent failed to respond to that correspondence.

representation and failed to consult with Mr. Tibbs' before allowing his case to be dismissed.

ER 1.2: Respondent failed to abide by Mr. Tibbs' decisions concerning the

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ER 1.3: Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in

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representing Mr. Warfield in this matter.

- 24. ER 1.4: Respondent failed to keep Mr. Warfield reasonably informed about the representation. Respondent failed to explain matters to the extent reasonably necessary so Mr. Warfield could make informed decisions concerning the representation.
- 25. ER 3.2: Respondent failed to expedite litigation consistent with the interest of Mr. Warfield.
- 26. ER 3.3: Respondent knowingly made a false statement of material fact to a tribunal.
- 27. ER 4.1: Respondent knowingly made a false statement of material fact to a third erson.
- 28. ER 8.1(b) and Supreme Court Rule 51(h) and (i): Respondent failed to respond to a lawful demand for information from the State Bar, failed to furnish information to or respond promptly to a request from bar counsel, and failed to cooperate with State Bar staff.
- 29. ER 8.4(c): Respondent engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
- 30. ER 8.4(d): Respondent's conduct in this matter was detrimental to the administration of justice.

In addition to the foregoing violations, the State Bar suggests that Respondent's conduct in Counts Two and Three violated ER 8.4(c) which declares that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. While there is nothing laudable about Respondent's activities as alleged (and admitted) in Counts Two or Three, there is no allegation in either of those two counts which even suggest that Respondent engaged in any conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. As such, the undersigned finds no violation of that particular Ethical Rule.

ABA STANDARDS

ABA Standard 3.0 provides that four criteria should be considered when imposing discipline: (1) the duty violated; (2) the lawyer's mental state, (3) the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (4) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.

This Hearing Officer considered Standards 4.41, 6.21 and 7.1 in determining the appropriate sanction warranted by Respondent's conduct in this case. These standards provide that:

- 4.41 Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
 - (a) a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or
 - (b) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or
 - (c) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.
- 6.21 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a court order or rule with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding.
- 7.1 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, or the legal system.

Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer abandons his practice, leaving clients completely unaware that they have no legal representation and often leaving clients without any legal remedy. Such abandonment can cause serious or potentially serious injury to clients. Disbarment is also generally appropriate with knowing violations of court orders and where a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that violates a duty owed to the profession which causes serious injury or potentially serious to a client, the public or the legal system.

Here, Respondent abandoned a number of clients, knowingly failed to obey a lawful court order, lied to the court, co-counsel and his clients, failed to return client files and failed to participate in the disciplinary process. His actions caused actual harm to his clients, to the public and to the legal system.

After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating circumstances pursuant to Standards 9.22 and 9.32 are to be considered in determining sanctions. Although no aggravation/ mitigation hearing was requested by either party, the undersigned Hearing Officer finds the following factors should be considered.

In aggravation:

Standard 9.22(a) - prior disciplinary offenses. Respondent is currently suspended for

misconduct found in File No. 01-2559.

Standard 9.22(c) - pattern of misconduct. Respondent has clearly abandoned a number of clients.

Standard 9.22(d) - multiple offenses. Again, Respondent has clearly abandoned a number of clients.

Standard 9.22(e) — bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency. Respondent utterly failed to respond to repeated requests for information and to participate in the formal disciplinary process.

Standard 9.22(g) - refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct.

Standard 9.22(i) – substantial experience in the practice of law. Respondent has been a member of the State Bar for sixteen years.

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

The Supreme Court has held that, to achieve proportionality when imposing discipline and to achieve the purposes of discipline, in each situation such discipline must be tailored to the individual facts of the case. *In re Wines*, 135 Ariz. 203, 660 P.2d 454 (1983) and *In re Wolfram*, 174 Ariz. 49, 847 P.2d 94 (1993). However, because sanctions against lawyers must have internal consistency to maintain an effective and enforceable system, cases that are factually similar are particularly instructive. *In re Pappas*, 159 Ariz. 516, 526, 768 P.2d 1161, 1171 (1988).

The Hearing Officer found several cases critical to the determination of an appropriate sanction in this case.

In Matter of Woltman, 181 Ariz. 525, 892 P.2d 861 (1995), attorney Woltman was found to have converted client funds, failed to perform work for which he was retained, failed to provide clients with competent and diligent representation, failed to maintain communications with clients and to respond to their requests for information, and failed to return client files and property. In addition, Woltman was found to have made misrepresentations to clients concerning the status of their cases and, among other things, failed to cooperate with the State Bar's investigations into many of these matters. There were several aggravating circumstances and no mitigating factors. Woltman was disbarred.

In Matter of Young, 164 Ariz. 502, 794 P.2d 135 (1990), Young was found to have failed to provide competent legal representation, failed to appear in court, failed to comply with various

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court orders and rules, filed unsupported pleadings, misappropriated client funds, made false statements to a tribunal, failed to pay a judgment obtained against him by his clients and failed to cooperate with the State Bar's investigations into many of the complaints. Young was disbarred.

Finally, in Matter of Kobashi, 181 Ariz. 253, 889 P.2d 611 (1995), Kobashi was found to have, among other things, failed to maintain adequate communications with his clients and failed to respond to a request for information from his clients. In addition, he failed to respond to correspondence from the State Bar during the investigation. There were numerous aggravating factors and, as here, no mitigating factors. Kobashi was disbarred.

RECOMMENDATION

The purpose of lawyer discipline is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public and deter future misconduct. In re Fioramonti, 176 Ariz. 182, 187, 859 P.2d 1315, 1320 (1993). It is also the objective of lawyer discipline to protect the public, the profession and the administration of justice. In re Neville, 147 Ariz. 106, 708 P.2d 1297 (1985). Yet another purpose is to instill public confidence in the bar's integrity. Matter of Horwitz, 180 Ariz. 20, 29, 881 P.2d 352, 361 (1994).

Upon consideration of the facts, application of the Standards, including aggravating and mitigation factors, and a proportionality analysis, this Hearing Officer recommends that:

- Respondent be disbarred from the practice of law; 1.
- 2. Respondent be ordered to pay the costs and expenses incurred in these disciplinary proceedings; and
- 3. If Respondent successfully applies for readmission, he be required to comply with the terms of his current suspension.

DATED this 4 day of August, 2003.

Patricla E. Nolan

Hearing Officer 7Y

ORIGINAL filed with the Disciplinary Clerk this 4th day of August, 2003,

and a COPY mailed this same date to:

David W. Counce 15201 N 19th Way Phoenix, AZ 85022-0001 Respondent Shauna R. Miller Bar Counsel State Bar of Arizona 111 W. Monroe, Suite 1800 Phoenix, AZ 85003-1742 Maloserdof